Luhmann famously had it that society is not composed of individual humans. Rather, humans are composed, internally, of three separate, valid systems: life, language, and even the nervous system. What makes these systems valid, for Luhmann, is that they are autopoietic- fully able to reproduce themselves by reproducing their parts, from out of their own dynamics. Such systems are operationally closed: neurons aren't activated by words, but by each other, and DNA requires no words to make proteins. In any case, humans don't appear to count as a valid, autopoietic systems in themselves. If humans are not a system in the sociological systems- theoretic proper, what are they? This paper begins from the premise that we are not autopoietic, that we have no basic part which constitutes our internal dynamics. Instead, we appear to be substrates, or assemblages, for the communications of different systems. Yet we are not simply this locus; rather, I argue we are a "triggering board,"  a "computational device" for networked decision-making. But what does such a theory mean for our identity, and what does it mean for our efficacy in the social sphere? Such a theory redraws the boundaries of what humans are and this redraws our agency. This paper, pace Luhmann, ask how it is that we are lodged in society, but as cybernetic selves. It uses assemblage theory (Deleuze and Guattari, Jane Bennet), theory of the cyborg, and early cybernetic thinkers like Norbert Weiner to redefine the human-environment relation, and thus the concept of the human itself. Ultimately, what is traced is a move from autonomous human subjectivity, to something mechanistic - even machinic in the subject (the system) - and back again, ironically, toward a heightened sense of agency. My paper briefly highlights the historical trajectory of this posthumanist concept of networked, machinic agency by simultaneously tracing the conceptual movement from German Idealist notions of freedom at the onset of capitalist industrialization, to the WW II-era cybernetic revolution of Norbert Weiner, Heinz Von Foerster, and later, Maturana and Varela, etc., and on to the post-war, posthumanist, and late capitalist discovery of subjectivity as effected by surveillance. The paper ends by describing and speculating on the stakes of the interplay between liberal humanist concepts of human agency and the new forms it takes through the internet and media, surveillance technologies, and new cybernetic networks out there and in our everyday technologies.